nothing buttheconditions of thought in a possible experience just as space and timeare the conditions of intuition for thatsameexperience. Theyare fundamental concepts by which we think objects in general for appear ances [my italics] ."2 As has already been established in the Critique of Pure Reason, the human subject is given appearances andappearances only. "...Thething in itself...is not known, and cannotbe known...and in experience no question is ever asked in regard to it."3 It is the case that persons are not free to condition the things in themselves with the pure intuitions of space and time. Rather,the person receives objects in space and time because this is just the way in which the manifold is always presented to the human sub ject. Persons areonly privy to appearances. They arenot privy to thething in itself. Now, to derive any knowledge about appearances, persons must make synthetic judgments. The very condition of knowledge about ap pearances can only come about by way of the synthetic judgment.
In addition to this, Kant asserted that the thing in itself cannot be the objectof experience. Onlyappearances arejudged synthetically. Once the thing in itself is made present to the human subject, it is no longer the thing in itself. It is an appearance, becauseit is given in space and time. Appear ances come with extension, and they come in time. This spatio-temporal ordering cannot be known of the thing in itself.
Two places we may examine in order to expose the Kantian notion of synthetic judgment are the Transcendental Analytic and the Second Anal ogy of Experience.
We begin with the Transcendental Analytic. At A77, Kant states, "Space and time contain a manifold of pure a priori intu ition, but at the same time are conditions of the receptivity of our mind-conditions under which alone it can receive representations of objects, and, which therefore must also always affect the concept of these objects. But if this mani fold is to be known,the spontaneity of our thoughtrequires that it be gone through in a certain way,taken up, and con Kant is concerned with how it is possible for the human subject to synthe size causal judgments in the world correctly. This is obvious from the fact that Kant claims that time is a product of the pure intuition. Because, if time is a product of the pure intuition, then it could be possible that persons could make judgments about phenomenal objects that do not correspond to how the noumenal objects truly are. To wit, the human subject is always intuiting time relations of succession. So, how do we know that our judg ments of time succession correspond to the way things really are?
The answer is that the experience that we humans have that is synthetic must somehow have, as its ground, the thing in itself. As Wayne Waxman states, "If any objective necessity at all is to be salvaged for the temporal order of representations, it can only be through relation to the thing in it self."8 Of course, this objective necessity of the temporal order of repre sentations is extremely problematic. We cannot know anything about the noumenal realm at all. The very derivation of this objective necessity is what Kant is looking for in the Second Analogy, and any further discussion of this particular problem is certainly beyond the scope of this paper.
There are moments when Kant seems to ascribe the same type ofcause and effect judgments to the things in themselves that he ascribes to the appearances. I assert that the reason for this is that Kant is trying to give the appearance some sort of ground in the thing in itself. We find in Sec tion 6 of the Antinomy of Pure Reason, "...To say that [objects of the senses] exist prior to all my experience is only to assert that they are to be met with if, starting from perception, I advance to that part of experi ence to which they belong. The cause of empirical condi tions of this advance...is transcendental, and is therefore necessarily unknown to me."9 Here, Kant is forwarding two important points. First, we find Kant claim ing that there is, in fact, transcendental causality. Second, Kant clearly claims that whatever it is which is in the realm of the transcendental is not knowable.
8 Wayne Waxman. "Kant's Analogies." The Review of Metaphysics. Sept. 1993, Vol. 47, No. 1. 9lbid.,A496.
In the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection we find, "Understand ing... does...think for itselfan object in itself, but only as transcendental object, which is the cause of appearance and therefore not itself appear ance...."!0 The transcendental object seems to have an affect on the 'fac ulty of knowledge' and the 'understanding'. However, cause and effect relationships can never be known in the transcendental. Transcendental matters can only be thought. The Kantian claim will be that 'cause and effect' is a function ofsynthesis. 'Cause and effect' has itsplace insofar as pertaining to how the understanding synthesizes phenomenal objects. This is where the apparent contradiction arises. Kant claims at one time that the appearance is the only object that can betaken bythe human subject for synthesis by way of the categories. In summary, persons are given appearances. The appearances come in space and time, because the understanding can only have objects inspace and time. The human subject isnot free to experience things apart from space and time. Synthetic judg ments are always ofappearances. When Kant speaks ofa known cause by the transcendental object, the apparent contradiction is this: Kant seemsto say that the Kant knows that the transcendental isthe cause ofthe appear ance. However, 'cause and effect' must be, asa rule, a synthetic judgment This is a fine summation of the noumenal/phenomenal distinction on the whole. However, I would like to make one point. It seems that Strawson is blatantly setting the Kantian position in such a way as to attack it. I point to the fact that Strawson uses the term 'affects' in regard to the agency that the thing in itself has toward the phenomenon. For the purposes of my essay, we must allow that Kant is not condemned, yet, to this language. The Kantian doctrine, on the whole, may still find a way to elude the need to use such causal terms in regard to the relationship between noumena and phenomena. We find the problem already in hand with Strawson, but, nev ertheless, we continue through Strawson's argument.
Strawson goes on to give two concepts which he sees as inherent to the phenomena/noumena split-the concept of identity of reference and the concept of the 'corrected view'. Strawson states, "When it is said that a thing appears to be thus-and-so, but really is not, it seems to be implied that there are two dif ferent standpoints from which it would be natural to make different and incompatible judgments about the same thing. ...The standpoints...must have something in common, so that there is some way...of securingidentity of reference to the thing which is judged."12 Strawson concludes from this, "...our sensible experience is the causal out come of our being affected by the objects we say we perceive."13 Strawson is extremely reticent to give examples here to explain his position, so I shall provide one of my own. Consider the classic example of the stick that appears to be bent when half of it is immersed into water. When the stick is observed to be bent, persons tend to apply Strawson's first concept-the identity of reference. The observer must have in mind two ideas. He or she has in mind, first, the idea of the 'original' stick. This is the 'straight' stick. Then, the observer contemplates the 'second' stick. It is 'bent'. (It seems inappropriate to say it 'appears' bent at this point.) Now,the observer applies the concept of identity of reference. In doing so, the observer claims that the first stick with its properties and the second stick with its properties are actually the same stick. I grant that Strawson is 12 The Bounds ofSense, pp. 250-251. correct insofar as his notion of the identity of reference does become ap plied by human being all the time in 'common-sense'. Now, Strawson combines the concept of identity of reference with the concept of the corrected-view. On Strawson's account, the corrected-view comes about when an observer has a privileged position to a particular object of consciousness.14 It seems that this privilege could occur when one person corrects another person or when one person corrects himself or herself. Let usagain take the example ofthestick. It ispractically a rule of common-sense to say that the stick is not really bent when it is in the water.
We purport the corrected-view. We say that the stick appears to be bent when it is in fact not really bent.
Strawson proceeds toward his conclusion. He asks, what can be the function that makes the corrected-view inlight ofthe fact that we allagree that the thing observed is not the thing as it actually is? Strawson claims that it must be intuition for Kant. Strawson states that the 'view' of the object of the corrected-view is not a view at all. In a word, the correctedview is never strictly a view in the sense that it is never sensible.15 The corrected-view can onlycomefrom a further synthetic judgment.
The question remains, howdo we know that our synthetic judgment is veridical? In other words, how do persons arrive at the correct synthetic judgment? For Strawson, the only waythat personscan ever have veridical experience is because appearances are caused by transcendental things. Therecan be no absolute veridical knowledge without the appearance be ingcaused bythething in itself. Otherwise, theappearance would be pure phantom. There would be no certainty in our synthetic judgment that the crooked stick is not a veridical experience. What would be the basis for judging the crooked stick to be non-veridical? The answer is there would be no basis for judging the crooked stick as illusion. Our judgments re main capricious for Strawson without the causal agency of the thing in itself.1* Strawson argues that Kant is committed to having actual causal effi cacy for the thing in itself. The thing in itself must be the cause of the appearance, or the appearance is not grounded in anything. If the appear ance is not grounded in anything, then veridical knowledge must be an illusion.17 We proceed now to a defense of Kant and Kantian philosophy from Strawson's attack. In doing so, one thing is certain: There must be an accounting of Kant's statements which point to transcendental causality. Some of them have been placed earlier in the paper, and there is no doubt that any attack which takes Kant to task for making those statements must be acceptable prima facie. That is to say that when Kant on the one hand puts causality in the categories while, on the other hand stating that the transcendental is somehow the cause of the phenomenal, a problem can certainly be perceived. I will hold that this problem can be overcome, however. To do this it will be imperative to look at two different senses of causality.
Nicholas Rescher provides us with these two types of cause. First, there is authentic causality. By authentic causality, Rescher means the empirical causality which humans observe in the spatial-temporal realm.18 So, whenever persons engage in causal judgments-judgments such as perceptions of a game of billiards where it is judged synthetically that the fifteen ball caused the nine ball to move-persons are speaking of authen tic causality. Rescher clearly states that this is the causality of which Kant speaks in the Critique of Pure Reason when Kant speaks of causality as only occurring as a result of synthesis through the category of 'cause and effect'.
Rescher establishes the second type of causality as transcendental. Rescher calls this "a not properly causal generic grounding."19 He holds to the Kantian distinction between 'intelligibility' and 'knowability' by stating that this grounding is intelligible and not knowable. Rescher goes on to say, "The kinship between the two sorts of 'causality' is sufficiently remote that the employment of the same terms-such as 'affecting'-in both cases must be regarded as purely analogical."20 17 It seems that Strawson is guilty tocommitting himself to theCorrespondence Theory of Truth. I will not comment on the denial of the Correspondence Theory of Truth that Kant makes other than to say that Kant is correct in asserting that there would be no phenomenal object in the first place (there would only be the thing in itself) if it were not for the human subject. The Copernican Revolution in Philosophydefacto attacks the Correspondence I take this definition of Kant's to be an explanation of how the phenom enon is ever grounded by the noumenon. When Kant speaks of a series of conditions for given appearances, what does he mean? An example of this is as follows. First, we should gather an idea of some particular appear ance. The appearance of a pen will do. Now, any pen will always be a completely phenomenal object. Of course, it seems absurd that anyone should speak of a transcendental pen. Now, since this pen is phenomenal, it is, by definition, conditioned. The human subject has already made a judgment about the world which he or she is experiencing. In this case, the subject has made a seemingly veridical observation. He or she has encoun tered a pen.
After this is done, the human subject is left to make any number of judgments about the pen. According to the purposes of this paper, let us look to one synthetic and categorical judgment that the subject can makethe judgment of 'cause and effect'. The person will want to know how it is that the pen arrives qua pen. Well, the pen has been empirically caused, we say, by several processes. The people who manufactured the pen take cer tain materials like plastic, metal, and ink and then put them together in a certain way. 28 Kent Baldner. "Causality and Things inThemselves." Synthese. No.77,1988, pp.354-357. hisclaim that thething in itselfis theonly entity which hasa true claim to the term thing. The appearance isonly derivable by the human subject by way of the thing in itself. By the very fact that the appearance has an ontological dependence on the thing initself, itfollows that the appearance ispossessive ofno ontological dependence without the thing initself. The thing in itself isthe ultimate ontological entity for Kant. Even though it is not knowable, it isstill the underlying 'x' that makes any experience at all possible.
The true difference between the phenomenon and the noumenon is not ontological. It is epistemological. We can know thephenomenon, butwe can only think the thing initself. The noumenon is not knowable strictly because we can never be privy tothe unconditioned being. Everything any person knows must, bydefinition forKant, besuch thatit isphenomenal in character. The noumenon is intelligible. It happens to be the ultimate ontological entity, although human beings cannot know itbecause the very possibility ofknowledge isgrounded onthe categories. The categories can only provide for synthetic judgments on appearances, not things in them selves. Other than on this point, I concur with Rescher's view of transcen dental causality. Henry Allison has this to say about the problem. "...The problem has been misconstrued.... As traditionally understood, the issue is whether the affecting object is an appearance, a thing in itself, or perhaps both. This formulation is based, at least tacitly, on theassumption thatthedistinction between appearances and things in themselves is between two kinds of entity."31 I agree with Allison here. There arenottwokinds of entityhere. There is one entity with full ontological status-the thing in itself. The appearance depends on the thing in itself for its ontological status. judgments synthetically about the causes and effects in a game. Further more, persons are able to agree with one another about causal events be cause persons are allendowed with the same faculties ofintuition. Through the intuition (which isthe same for all persons) and the affinity of the sen sible manifold, we can have a view ofcausality that isvalid for all persons.
There isno transcendental causality that isthe same type ofcausality as isgiven in the empirical relations ofphenomenal objects. This the gen eral position ofthe Kantian doctrine as Kant saw itinthe Prolegomena and as many contemporary philosophers see it.
The noumenal thing is merely the grounding for the phenomenal ob ject. We need this grounding to establish the objectivity of experience.
Rescher is quite correct in stating this, but he does go too far in establishing that the noumenon and the phenomenon should be ontologically distinct.
All that is necessary is anepistemological distinctness between noumenon and phenomenon. When noumenal causality is viewed as merely analogi cal, then the problem of the apparent contradiction disappears. Humean skepticism becomes refutable without contradiction.
Avery important consideration that has been ignored for the purposes ofthis paper isthe idea ofthe person asboth phenomenon and noumenon.
Itis clear from Kant's discussion ofthis34 that ifwe are to deny intelligible causal efficacy for the noumenal self, then we are denying that there can be any practical freedom atall. Kant's discussion ofpractical freedom comes in the Groundingfor the Metaphysics ofMorals, and, any important discus sion ofthis notion of practical freedom is beyond the scope of this paper.
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